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Abstract: We report results from a large online randomised tax experiment in Guatemala. The trial
involves short messages and choices presented to taxpayers as part of a CAPTCHA pop-up window
immediately before they file a tax return, with the aim of priming honest declarations. In total our
sample includes 627,242 taxpayers and 3,232,430 tax declarations made over four months. Treatments
include: honesty declaration; information about public goods; information about penalties for
dishonesty, questions allowing a taxpayer to choose which public good they think tax money should
be spent on; or questions allowing a taxpayer to state a view on the penalty for not declaring honestly.
We find no impact of any of these treatments on the average amount of tax declared. We discuss
potential causes for this null effect and implications for ‘online nudges’ around honesty priming.
Keywords: tax compliance; behavioural economics; randomised field experiments; international
development
1. Introduction
Improving the fairness, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of tax systems will be critical to
achieving the sustainable development goals [1]. Where countries such as Guatemala fail to collect tax
revenue effectively from their citizens, there are consequences for the ability to deliver public services
and, where tax compliance is patchy, general confidence in the government’s competence and fairness
may also be compromised. This natural field experiment involved priming honesty among Guatemalan
taxpayers filing online declarations for income tax or value-added tax (VAT). Treatment messages were
included as part of a pop-up CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers
and Humans Apart) window on the tax declaration website (Declaraguate) immediately prior to
individuals reaching a declaration form. The large-scale trial involves all people who completed
an online tax return between August 2014 and January 2015 (627,242 individuals, completing a total of
3.2 million tax returns).
Randomised controlled trials in a natural context, commonly referred to as natural field
experiments in the social sciences [2,3], are becoming the gold standard for evidence-based
policy-making, and their increased use is being advocated in governments and organisations [4–7].
Field experiments encouraging honest tax reporting, in particular, have a long tradition among
economists, psychologists and policy scholars [8–12]. Some have found that the mention of increased
audits or penalties has a positive impact on tax compliance, e.g., [13–15]. These interventions
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are in part based on laboratory or survey experiments that have studied what structural factors
promote contributions to public goods in general (e.g., [7,16,17]) and paying taxes in particular
(e.g., [18,19]). Others have been able to prompt more compliance using behaviourally inspired messages
(often referred to as ‘nudges’, [20]. For example, Hallsworth et al. [21] found in a large-scale field
experiment in the United Kingdom that letters communicating the widespread social norm of paying
taxes on time increases the fraction of taxpayers who pay their taxes on time. In a similar experiment
in Guatemala, Kettle et al. [12] showed that behaviourally informed letters more than triple receipts
from late income tax filers. Perez-Truglia and Troiano [22] demonstrated in a field experiment that
a ‘shaming’ policy can be effective in reducing tax delinquency.
Taxpayers in our trial were randomly allocated to either see one of six messages, or be part of
a control group, which saw the original CAPTCHA without any behavioural message. The trial finds
no differential impact between the original CAPTCHA (which contains no behavioural prompts)
and various prompts inspired by behavioural science. Treatments included an honesty declaration,
information about public goods paid for by taxes and punishment for noncompliance, and treatments
that allowed participants to choose what they believe to be a good use of public funds, or an appropriate
punishment. The results show that none of our treatments had a significant impact on tax declarations
in this context. The fact that all of the six treatments were found to be ineffective (rather than some)
supports the hypothesis that the setting in which the information was conveyed may have been crucial
here, rather than the content of the messages.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Tax Regime Selection
The trial involves Guatemalan taxpayers making declarations for income tax and value added tax
(VAT), of which there are two regimes for each. For income tax the default option is a gross income tax,
which entails a six percent direct tax on gross revenue. This option is also associated with simplified
accounting standards. The alternative is for taxpayers to self-select into a profits tax at the beginning
of the year, which entails a tax rate of 28 percent (in 2014) on taxable income or profit.
The two regimes for VAT both entail a 12 percent tax on the value of products. They differ,
however, in terms of eligibility and payment procedures. Taxpayers with an annual turnover of more
than GTQ 150,000 (approx. $19,200 USD at the time of the experiment) are part of the general regime,
while other taxpayers are part of the small taxpayers’ regime. VAT is charged on sales of goods within
the country, sale of services in the country, any imported goods, leasing contracts, transfers of real
estate, and insurance and bond sales. Exports, banking activities, payments in-kind, mergers, trade in
financial instruments, and trust arrangements are exempt from VAT. We consider taxpayers under
both regimes.
The trial involves all Guatemalans who declare their tax online. For income tax and VAT general,
online declaration is mandatory, while for VAT small taxpayers over 50 percent of declarations are
made online. However, in conversations with government officials, we learned that a large fraction of
Guatemalans are likely to be unregistered and thus not captured by the tax system. Our interventions
will thus only affect the fraction of citizens who have already made an ethical decision to register for
tax filing, although we note that this limitation is common to all tax compliance field experiments.
There are reasons to expect different treatment effects depending on the tax being declared.
The profits regime is charged at a higher rate than the simplified regime and so the incentive to behave
dishonestly may be higher (for a more thorough discussion of this, see Kettle et al. [12]). Individuals
and businesses that complete this kind of return may, however, be more affluent, which in turn could
reduce their incentive to be dishonest due to a lower marginal value of money, consistent with the
model put forward by Allingham and Sandmo [23]. The simplified option is, as its name implies,
a less complex form. This may lead to greater honesty as there are fewer dimensions across which it is
possible to obfuscate tax liability. Additionally, the differences in timing for declarations may affect
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behaviour. For VAT small taxpayers, and the gross income tax regime, declarations are made monthly.
These smaller and more frequent declarations may create more of an incentive to behave dishonestly
as the declarations are so common, or less so as the payments are smaller.
2.2. Sample Selection and Random Treatment Assignment
Our initial sample involves the universe of taxpayers that made a declaration for any of the
four tax regimes outlined above between August 2014 and January 2015. There are no restrictions
to eligibility; however, due to missing observations for some variables (and in particular for the
lagged value of declarations), our sample size for analysis is reduced from 715,190 participants to
627,242 participants. In total the trial involves 3,232,430 declarations by these 627,242 individuals.
Table 1 shows the random assignment of individuals across the seven trial arms as well as summary
statistics on demographics.
Randomisation is conducted at the individual level with no stratification. Randomisation was built
into www.declaraguate.gt, the website for tax declaration owned by the Guatemalan Tax Authority
(SAT), using a JavaScript random number generator that randomly draws an integer between 1 and 7
inclusive, using a standard (publicly available) algorithm. When an individual begins their tax return
this provides an instruction to the declaration website to display one of the seven treatment arms.
Randomisation is recorded by SAT as a field in the tax return data.
Individual randomisation was chosen as it is the most statistically efficient mechanism for
randomisation, in terms of both analysis and the quality of randomisation. In practice, this means
that individuals submitting multiple returns within the trial period are treated by a randomly
assigned treatment for each declaration. Contamination between individuals was not believed to be
a significant enough issue to warrant clustering the randomisation at a level above the individual.
As individuals are identified after treatment, individuals are assigned afresh on each individual visit.
We discuss the effects of first-time exposure to any condition and the repeated exposure to multiple
conditions separately.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of our sample (mean and standard deviation). Column 1 shows the
proportion of taxpayers who are women; column 2 lists the mean age in years; and columns 3–6 show
the proportion of taxpayers in each of the four tax types.
Condition Female Age Tax Type Filed (Proportion Declaring)
Gross
Income
Profits
Income
VAT Small
Taxpayers
VAT
General
Control Group 0.375 37.34 0.156 0.0202 0.526 0.297
(0.484) (17.91) (0.363) (0.141) (0.499) (0.457)
Honesty Declaration 0.374 37.47 0.154 0.0193 0.532 0.294
(0.484) (17.80) (0.361) (0.137) (0.499) (0.456)
Public Good 0.375 37.32 0.157 0.0204 0.528 0.295
(0.484) (17.93) (0.364) (0.141) (0.499) (0.456)
Enforcement 0.375 37.26 0.157 0.0201 0.528 0.295
(0.484) (17.93) (0.364) (0.140) (0.499) (0.456)
Choice Public Good 0.374 37.30 0.159 0.0206 0.524 0.296
(0.484) (17.96) (0.366) (0.142) (0.499) (0.456)
Choice Enforcement 0.372 37.34 0.161 0.0204 0.522 0.297
(0.483) (17.97) (0.367) (0.141) (0.500) (0.457)
Self-select, ‘I am Honest’
0.374 37.32 0.159 0.0199 0.527 0.295
(0.484) (17.93) (0.365) (0.140) (0.499) (0.456)
Total 0.374 37.34 0.158 0.0201 0.527 0.296
(0.484) (17.92) (0.364) (0.140) (0.499) (0.456)
Behav. Sci. 2017, 7, 28 4 of 21
2.3. Experimental Design and Treatments
Taxpayers are randomly assigned to one of seven arms; a control arm where taxpayers receive the
original CAPTCHA from the Declaraguate website, and six adapted versions that entail viewing or
interacting with a behavioural prompt in addition to typing the original CAPTCHA. The CAPTCHA
appears after the taxpayer selects the tax form to fill in on the main Declaraguate website, and before
the form page. Table 2 below presents an overview of the seven treatment arms which we then describe
in further detail below. The original Spanish versions of the treatment CAPTCHAs (and translations)
are included in Appendix A. The ‘customer journey’ of taxpayers through the websiteis included in
Appendix B (Figures A7–A9, i.e., the website and forms between which the CAPTCHAs appear).
The treatment arms are placed directly below where the characters are typed for the CAPTCHA,
but above the ‘fill form’ button which the taxpayer must press to continue to the next form. Some of
the treatment CAPTCHAs involve specific actions that the taxpayer has to complete before they are
able to press the ‘fill form’ button. These are described further below.
Table 2. Summary of treatment arms and behavioural prompts. Number of forms submitted (n) is
cumulative over the entire trial period.
Condition Message and Procedure
Control Group,
Number of forms
submitted = 585,872
 Typical CAPTCHA website design. Box states ‘please type the characters that
you see in the picture’.
 Once the characters from the picture are typed, the taxpayer is then able to click
on the ‘fill form’ button to take them to the declaration form.
Honesty Declaration,
Number of forms
submitted = 529,397
 Includes an honesty declaration that translates as: ‘Declaration: I will fill out
this form honestly. Please sign your name to confirm this declaration’
 The taxpayer must then enter their name in a box below this statement before
being able to press the ‘fill form’ button.
Public Good,
Number of forms
submitted = 573,676
 Includes an image of the Guatemalan flag, and the following public good
message: ‘In 2013 your taxes helped pay for schools, hospitals and policemen.’
Enforcement,
Number of forms
submitted = 563,670
 Includes an image of a gavel and the following text: ‘5,060 taxpayers in early
2014 had legal proceedings for breach of their tax obligations.’
Choice Public Good,
Number of forms
submitted = 548,915
 Gives the taxpayer a choice of public goods that they would like to see tax
money spent on: ‘Please choose what you want us to direct your tax money to:’
 The taxpayer must choose one of the options: schools; hospitals; or policemen,
before they are able to press the ‘fill form’ button.
Choice Enforcement,
Number of forms
submitted = 539,542
 Gives the taxpayer a choice of the punishment that they think people should
receive for fraudulently declaring their tax: ‘Please tell us what you think
should happen to people who fill out their forms dishonestly’
 The taxpayer must choose one of the options: pay a fine; confiscate your assets;
or go to jail, before they are able to press the ‘fill form’ button.
Self Select ‘I am Honest’,
Number of forms
submitted = 545,168
 Allows the taxpayer to self-select into being honest: ‘Which of the following do
you identify with?’
 The taxpayer then has to select one of the following two options: ‘I am
an honest taxpayer who declares truthfully’ or ‘I'm a busy taxpayer who
declares quickly’
2.3.1. Control Group
This CAPTCHA is the original used in the Declaraguate website. On the website the CAPTCHA
appears as a pop up box. The text states ‘please type the characters that you see in the picture’.
Below this is a picture containing jumbled but legible characters which need to be typed out by the
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taxpayer. Once the characters from the picture are typed, the taxpayer is then able to click on the
‘fill form’ button to take them to the declaration form.
2.3.2. Honesty Declaration
This CAPTCHA includes an honesty declaration that translates as: ‘Declaration: I will fill out this
form honestly. Please sign your name to confirm this declaration’. The taxpayer must then enter their
name in a box below this statement before being able to press the ‘fill form’ button. The treatment can
be seen in Figure A1.
The Honesty Declaration CAPTCHA is based around the idea that most people see themselves as
honest and act according to the ethical codes of society, but need reminders that these ethical codes
should apply to all their decision-making. For instance, research has found that people are more honest
when they are asked to recall the Ten Commandments just before making decisions where they have
an option to be dishonest [24].
Specifically in the context of filing forms, Shu et al. [25] show that moving an honesty declaration
to the start of a car insurance form increases truthful reporting of mileage driven each year.
The intervention was simple but very effective: while traditionally people would fill out their annual
insurance form and then sign their name at the bottom of the form, researchers moved both the
honesty declaration and signature box to the top of the insurance form before they would fill it
out. The intervention increased the number of miles declared by 10%. Other studies, for example
Bhanot [26], who investigated the effect of pledges on loan repayment rates, found somewhat smaller
effects, suggesting that this effect may have limitations.
The ‘honesty declaration CAPTCHA’ applies the same considerations to tax declarations.
We hypothesise that when participants sign their full name below an honest declaration, their moral
code is made more salient and hence they will be more likely to comply with it.
2.3.3. Public Good
This CAPTCHA involves an image of the Guatemalan flag and the following public good message:
‘In 2013 your taxes helped pay for schools, hospitals and policemen.’ The treatment can be seen in
Figure A2.
The Public Good CAPTCHA draws on the ‘non-deterrence’ approach to taxation; that citizens are
fundamentally predisposed to cooperate with tax authorities. The approach contends that taxpayers’
decisions are not based on utility maximisation alone, but are influenced by morality, social norms and
public goods, amongst other concepts [11,27–29]. In this view, the relationship between tax authority
and taxpayer is basically cooperative, with the latter asking ‘what should I do?’ rather than ‘what can I
get away with?’ [30]. The approach we take here is similar to Hallsworth [17].
In terms of administrative policy, the non-deterrence approach recommends that taxpayers are
treated fairly and respectfully. They should be provided with clear and helpful information in order to
make decisions. The authority should create a helpful service that makes it easy to comply. The route
to reducing non-compliance is to persuade taxpayers by emphasizing that tax compliance is an ethical
activity that is practised by the great majority of people, and that it creates valued public goods [28].
Following from this, the CAPTCHA is designed to prime taxpayers to think about the public goods that
tax money is spent on. We hypothesise that people who consider the benefits of their own contribution
will weigh this more heavily, relative to their own private consumption than they would do otherwise,
and so will be more likely to make an honest declaration.
2.3.4. Enforcement
This CAPTCHA involves an image of a gavel and the following text: ‘5060 taxpayers in early 2014
had legal proceedings for breach of their tax obligations.’ The treatment can be seen in Figure A3.
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The Enforcement CAPTCHA is based on the idea that signals of punishment enforcement can
be a powerful deterrence against unlawful actions [31]. Knowledge that others have been caught for
a crime can lead people to overestimate the likelihood that they could be the next to be caught [32].
Enforcement messages to increase taxation are based on the original economic model used to
analyse tax compliance developed by Allingham and Sandmo [23]. The model sees taxpayers as
rational utility maximisers and suggests that a taxpayer’s decision of whether to pay or evade tax
is based on the trade-off between the monetary cost of complying and the expected cost of evading.
The expected cost of evading is in turn based on the probability of getting caught, the probability of
punishment if caught, and the punishment for which they would be liable. Accordingly, this ‘deterrence’
model predicts that the way to deter tax evasion is through increased sanctions for noncompliance.
The enforcement CAPTCHA draws on making enforcement more salient to the taxpayer.
Similarly to the above, our hypothesis is that information on potential costs makes these costs more
salient and so adjusts relative weights of private consumption and taxpaying for the participant.
Enforcement messages on tax letters have been shown to be effective in a number of countries including
Argentina and Venezuela [33,34].
2.3.5. Choice Public Good
This CAPTCHA gives the taxpayer a choice of public goods that they would like to see tax
money spent on. The text of the CAPTCHA reads: ‘Please choose what you want us to direct your
tax money to:’ The taxpayer is then given the choice of selecting ‘schools’, ‘hospitals’, or ‘policemen’.
The treatment can be seen in Figure A4.
The design of this CAPTCHA incorporates a choice design with a public goods message.
Research shows that people like to have a say in the design of a product or policy [35]. It can
thus be effective to allow people to give an opinion on the cause towards which their tax money should
go. This hypothesis is supported by Lamberton, De Neve & Norton [36] who find that participants
who have had a chance to express non-binding preferences are 16% more likely to comply with tax
instituted in a laboratory setting.
The intervention aims to prime the taxpayer into thinking about the public goods that tax goes
towards, giving them the option to voice their preference. Our hypothesis is that even a cursory sense
of control over public spending provides a sense of ownership and hence leads to taxpaying being
more highly valued. The number of choices is limited to three in order to avoid potential cognitive
exhaustion before filling out the form [37].
2.3.6. Choice Enforcement
This CAPTCHA gives the taxpayer a choice of the punishment that they think people should
receive for fraudulently declaring their tax: ‘Please tell us what you think should happen to people
who fill out their forms dishonestly’. The taxpayer is then given the choice of selecting; pay a fine,
confiscate your assets, or go to jail. The treatment can be seen in Figure A5.
This design is based on the same premise as above but incorporates punishment choices rather
than public good choices. This CAPTCHA aims to prime the taxpayer into thinking about what should
happen to people who do not pay their tax honestly.
The message also aims to invoke cognitive dissonance [38] in taxpayers who would have filled
out the form dishonestly. We hypothesise that participants will suffer from cognitive dissonance due
to the clash between their beliefs that dishonest declarers should be punished, and their dishonest
actions. Under this hypothesis, participants would seek to resolve this dissonance by bringing their
actions in line with their beliefs.
2.3.7. Self-Select ‘I Am Honest’
This CAPTCHA allows the taxpayer to self-select into being honest. The CAPTCHA reads:
‘Which of the following do you identify with?’ The taxpayer then has to select one of the following
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two options: ‘I am an honest taxpayer who declares truthfully’ or ‘I am a busy taxpayer who declares
quickly’. The treatment can be seen in Figure A6.
The principle applied in the Self Select ‘I am honest’ CAPTCHA is that individuals are asked to
voluntarily declare their identity. The signals in our prompts are costless; thus choosing an option that
signals a positive and honest indication (despite whatever declaration is actually made) should be
expected of all individuals. On the one hand, this intervention might trigger an identity of an honest
taxpayer [39–42], Benjamin et al. [43] find that triggering identity as a member of a religious group has
significant impacts on the tendency to donate to the public good, but that this varies depending on the
group identity being invoked. On the other hand, self-selection of the other (non-honesty-promoting)
option is based on research that has found that people may reveal their identity (or ‘type’), even when
there is no need to do so and that self-identification is not beneficial [44].
People are asked which of the two categories they would put themselves in—one is clearly
positive while the other is not overly negative. The latter category is more likely to be chosen by
people who would want an excuse for not filing their taxes properly and would not easily be moved
by a nudge to act honestly [45]. However, everyone else will choose the former category—and they
not only self-select into this category, but are being nudged into being honest (like in the ‘honesty
declaration’ CAPTCHA above).
Conversely, however, the potential for ‘adverse nudging’ could apply to those who choose the
second category: they might feel more justified in making a dishonest declaration. This might open
the door for increased fraudulent behaviour, but might equally be offset by more targeted audits of
those who self-select into the second category. It enables law enforcement to more easily identify
people who might not have filed their taxes completely honestly as data will be gathered on those that
self-categorised as those with too little time to do their taxes correctly to avoid the ‘honesty’ nudge.
The specific writing of this design also involves a further insight. Recently, evidence has emerged
that subtle linguistic cues can have a substantial impact on our maintenance of our self-image and,
consequently, on our ethical decision-making. In a study by Bryan et al. [46], the authors found that
the phrase ‘I am a voter’ is more effective than ‘voting’ in inducing voter turnout because the first one
feels to people like an association of their self-image (not just an act they do).
Similarly, Bryan et al. [47] find that people identify themselves with ‘I am’ more than non-identity
invoked primes in the context of cheating. In three experiments people were asked not to cheat on a task.
In the instructions cheating was either referred to in the context of an actor’s identity (‘Please don’t
be a cheater’) or using language that referred to the action (‘Please don’t cheat’). People who had
been asked not to be a cheater were less likely to cheat compared to those where the action of cheating
was mentioned.
For this treatment, we hypothesise a similar cognitive dissonance to that described in the previous
treatment. In addition, we hypothesise that participants will be primed with a sense of identity as
an ‘honest’ individual, to which they will feel the desire to conform.
2.4. Outcome Variables
This trial was pre-registered in the American Economic Association’s Trial Registry
(#AEARCTR-0000424) in advance of trial execution. The publicly available trial protocol included
the main analysis plan, including the primary outcome variables, the regression model, and power
calculations for sample size estimation based on our estimates of how the population might respond
to the interventions.
The objective of this trial can be framed in one of two ways: to increase tax revenues in Guatemala,
or to encourage more honesty in the declaration of tax liabilities. The first outcome variable is
a continuous non-negative number of tax declared, while the latter is a binary variable that is 1 if
a citizen declared any non-zero tax, and 0 otherwise. Total tax liability declared is our primary outcome
measure, followed by any tax declared in our secondary analysis.
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Following Shu et al. [25], we assume that if a participant is reporting their tax liability dishonestly
(as opposed to making an error), they will systematically understate their liability relative to the truth.
We further assume that misreporting through error is statistically similar to classical measurement
error, and so is randomly distributed around the true value according to some unknown distribution.
We assume that this error is (a) classical (b) orthogonal on treatment, and (c) does not interact with
treatment—i.e. that the measurement error does not affect treatment. If (a) does not hold, we may
experience a loss of power, and any treatment effect detected would be a lower bound on the true
effect size; (b) holds by design of the trial, and the validity of (c) is irrelevant if (b) holds.
2.5. Sample Size Estimation
Based on previous research [12,17] we estimated the possible effect of our interventions to be
around a 2% increase in total tax liability declared. We estimated the sample standard deviation to
be 369.87 Quetzales (US $48.28) and based our sample size calculations on 80% power. Given these
estimates, we arrived at a total sample size of 60,087 participants per arm, for a total minimum sample
size requirement of 420,000 participants, although our ultimate sample size was larger. We are powered
to detect effects of between 1 and 2% increases in tax declared (the sample size requirement for 1% is
241,000 per arm).
3. Results
3.1. Estimation
The outcome measure for this trial is the total tax liability declared by individuals. Although the
outcome measure is relatively straightforward, the structure of the trial and data present potential
complications, which we seek to address here.
As described above, participants taking part in the trial will be subject to at least one of four
different forms of tax. The rates and levels of these taxes are different, and so, as discussed above,
we may see differential impacts of our treatments by tax type. As such, the effect of pooled analysis
across all four tax types is likely to be statistically inefficient, as the increased variance due to pooling
is likely to be more detrimental to statistical power than the increased number of observations is
beneficial. Hence, for each model specified below, we produce four results, one for each type of tax in
our trial. Primary analysis is conducted only on ‘clean’ observations—that is, where the observation
is the first time an individual has received any treatment. Primary use of all four months’ data risks
underestimation or overestimation of treatment effects due to repeated exposure and ordering effects.
Given the dynamic structure of our data, we remain confident that conservative effect sizes may still
be detected.
Our primary model of interest is:
Yit = α + β1 + Yit−x + β2Cit + β3Xi + β4t + β5dit + ui (1)
Where Yit is our outcome measure, the amount of tax declared by individual i in month t; α is a constant
term, capturing the amount of tax declared by participants in the control group in the first month
contained in the data; and Yit−x is a vector of lagged values of the outcome measure. Where participants
have failed to make declarations in a given past period, these are set to 0. Cit is a vector of binary
treatment variables, one for each of our treatment CAPTCHAs (i.e., excluding the control CAPTCHA),
set to 1 if a participant sees that CAPTCHA and 0 otherwise; Xi is a vector of time-invariant participant
characteristics, including age, gender and region (see Appendix C (Tables A1–A3)) for the balance
check of the control variables); t is a linear time trend in trial-months; dit is the day within-month that
the declaration is received; and ui is the error term.
3.2. Primary Analysis—First Exposure Only
Table 3, columns 1 to 5 show the parameter estimates for the Intention-to-Treat (ITT) model
described above. The results show no significant impact of any of our treatments on the amount of tax
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declared by individuals. For reference, the mean level of the outcome measure in the control group
for all participants is included at the bottom of the table. Thus, using the model specified in our trial
protocol, we find no impact of any the treatment conditions. All of the secondary analysis below falls
outside of our original protocol and so results are treated accordingly.
Table 3. Linear regression ITT estimates of treatment impacts on tax declaration (in Quetzales) with
the control condition as baseline. First exposure to any treatment only. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Gross
Income)
(Profits
Income) (VAT Small)
(VAT
General)
(Pooled
Taxes)
Sign before −6.432 −71.332 −0.560 −2.468 −1.170
(−12.468) (−60.643) (−0.643) (−4.644) (−1.273)
Public Good 10.244 −86.205 −0.291 −9.302 −1.200
(−20.846) (−66.939) (−0.615) (−8.405) (−2.080)
Enforcement 2.094 −64.222 −0.397 −3.472 −1.639
(−13.704) (−74.212) (−0.658) (−4.774) (−1.263)
Public Good Choice −0.783 −89.340 −0.772 −8.419 −2.603 *
(−11.658) (−62.236) (−0.661) (−5.100) (−1.315)
Enforcement Choice −7.950 −102.452 −0.019 1.178 −0.580
(−12.840) (−67.784) (−0.685) (−10.492) (−2.370)
Self-select Honesty 20.135 −46.944 −0.971 −1.382 0.204
(−15.040) (−65.386) (−0.613) (−5.341) (−1.577)
Age −0.426 −0.605 −0.030 * −0.219 −0.142 *
(−0.281) (−0.745) (−0.014) (−0.154) (−0.058)
Female −20.820 ** 39.438 −0.321 −1.231 −0.667
(−7.546) (−36.834) (−0.374) (−2.805) (−0.793)
Central Region 21.652 −4.330 7.092 *** 7.296 5.533 ***
(−11.091) (−15.456) (−0.513) (−4.109) (−1.064)
Northern Region 22.997 89.048 −1.528 * −0.428 0.149
(−15.765) (−45.614) (−0.609) (-6.604) (−1.489)
Eastern Region −2.401 45.397 1.735 *** 7.947 2.885 *
(−14.240) (−45.505) (−0.504) (−5.353) (−1.149)
Access Month 29.559 * 147.802 * 20.001 *** 22.070 *** 22.717 ***
(−14.181) (−66.204) (−0.514) (−6.069) (−1.086)
Access Day 3.527 ** 7.665 * 0.803 *** 0.657 ** 0.848 ***
(−1.185) (−3.422) (−0.032) (−0.201) (−0.038)
Constant −71.210 −278.628 * −40.138 *** −40.981 * −43.749 ***
(−43.955) (−127.002) (−1.663) (−18.079) (−3.038)
Lagged Declarations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean 190.27 90.73 58.70 270.47 109.18
Observations 24641 2177 467409 133015 627242
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
3.3. Secondary Analysis—Full Sample
Despite our expectation that people filing different tax types would respond differently, we do
not see any differences across tax types. Thus, in Table 3 column 5, we pool tax types in order to see if
increasing our power allows us to detect any effects. The results show that the parameter estimates
all remain insignificant other than public good choice which becomes negative at the five percent
significance level. This result is unlikely to be a robust effect as we now have 30 treatment condition
parameter estimates, making a false positive likely.
Next we conduct further analysis using the full dataset available to us. That is, instead of looking
at first exposures to the treatment conditions only, we expand our analysis to all interactions of
individuals with the treatment conditions. This gives us over 400,000 observations for three out
of the four tax types and over 3 million observations when we pool tax types. Table 4 shows the
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results of this analysis. The results again show no impact of any of our treatments on tax declarations.
We therefore have strong evidence that none of our interventions have had an impact on the amount
of tax declared by individuals. It is perhaps worth noting, however, that in our most highly powered
analysis (column 5 of Table 4), which makes use of all observations of all tax types, the most effective
treatment, signing first, is statistically significant at the 10% level in a two-tailed test (5% in a one-tailed
test), although in samples of this size it is far from conclusive.
Table 4. Linear regression ITT estimates of treatment impacts on tax declaration (in Quetzales) with the
control condition as baseline and control variables. Full sample of all tax declarations. Robust standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Gross Income) (Profits Income) (VAT Small) (VAT General) (Pooled Taxes)
Sign before 6.224 81.742 −0.286 19.266 6.598
(7.483) (105.072) (0.389) (15.302) (3.861)
Public Good 1.192 −41.440 −0.512 −4.228 −1.152
(6.234) (50.409) (0.372) (12.568) (3.089)
Enforcement 0.563 −4.401 −0.271 8.405 1.765
(6.592) (44.509) (0.383) (14.419) (3.491)
Public Good Choice −2.609 −52.511 −0.345 9.547 2.162
(5.887) (41.748) (0.387) (14.896) (3.558)
Enforcement Choice −7.217 −35.598 0.641 3.806 0.300
(6.313) (67.750) (0.425) (14.026) (3.398)
Self-select Honesty 0.162 193.019 −0.191 −12.334 -0.536
(5.992) (164.711) (0.385) (12.415) (3.353)
Age −0.350 * −3.387 −0.009 0.729* 0.396 **
(0.163) (2.352) (0.010) (0.340) (0.132)
Female −14.913 *** 6.568 −0.557 * −40.296 *** −14.092 ***
(4.028) (55.787) (0.241) (6.401) (1.954)
Central Region 16.549 * 50.940 8.273 *** 74.527 *** 33.112 ***
(8.239) (40.881) (0.301) (10.841) (3.646)
Northern Region −0.525 −46.185 −4.282 *** 33.353 ** 4.664
(11.834) (30.883) (0.312) (12.848) (2.605)
Eastern Region 3.838 −31.319 −0.431 33.614 *** 5.369 **
(9.135) (25.455) (0.317) (9.441) (1.886)
Access Month 3.989 ** 90.629 0.800 *** −4.263 −0.673
(1.509) (59.315) (0.083) (2.367) (0.601)
Access Day 2.677 *** 3.163 0.082 *** 0.746 * 0.120
(0.631) (3.328) (0.012) (0.376) (0.103)
Constant −6.622 −126.860 10.202 *** −6.060 5.706
(12.560) (131.249) (0.834) (19.377) (5.276)
Lagged Declarations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean 259.07 207.88 58.18 419.32 169.07
Observations 423832 26983 2036259 745356 3232430
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
3.4. Impact of Treatments on Propensity to Declare
Finally we consider that our treatments may have an impact on the propensity to declare at all.
We therefore run regressions with a binary variable as our outcome variable. Similar to our primary
results, we find no impact of any of our treatments on the propensity to declare for each individual
tax type. Table 5 shows the coefficients of our treatments on the propensity to declare with our taxes
pooled, suggesting there was no impact on the propensity to declare. The only exception is that
‘enforcement choice’ during first exposure only has a negative impact of 0.5 percent on the propensity
to declare. The combination of the relatively small effect size and the number of statistical comparisons
necessary in this trial make it likely that this is a spurious effect.
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Table 5. Treatment impacts on propensity to declare a non-zero amount; all tax types are pooled.
Variable (1) (2)
First Exposure Full Sample
Sign before 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Public Good −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Enforcement 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Public Good Choice −0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Enforcement Choice −0.005 * −0.002
(0.002) (0.001)
Self-select Honesty −0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Age 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.039 *** 0.031 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
Central Region −0.061 *** −0.064 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
Northern Region −0.041*** −0.035 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
Eastern Region −0.054 *** −0.047 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
Trial Month 0.031 *** −0.001 ***
(0.001) (0.000)
Access Day −0.000 0.000 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.255 *** 0.334 ***
(0.004) (0.003)
Lagged Declarations Yes Yes
Observations 627242 3232430
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
4. Discussion
The results of this large-scale field experiment show that none of our treatments in this context
had a significant impact on tax declaration. Interventions that have been shown to be successful
elsewhere are found to have no impact on the amount declared in this context. Given the previous
successful replication of various honesty declarations in a different field context (e.g., [26,48]), it is
important to consider what contextual factors could have caused this failure to replicate.
We speculate that this could be for a number of reasons. First, the interventions were not a part
of the form themselves (as, for example, they were in Shu et al. [25]). As we were not able in this
trial to alter the forms themselves, the interventions were placed in a pop-up window as part of
a CAPTCHA. This could have meant that the messages were too far separated from the filling in of the
tax declaration, which appears to be in keeping with the findings of Bhanot [26]. Second, the setting of
the CAPTCHA itself could have negated the impact of the messages, as CAPTCHA participants may
simply ignore the extraneous prompts in a bid to progress to the main form. This could have made
our treatments seem like a task rather than inviting thought about their content. The fact that all six
treatments were found to be ineffective (rather than some) supports the hypothesis that the setting in
which the information was conveyed was crucial here, rather than the content of the messages. Third,
online nudges in some settings, including honesty primes with e-signatures, have been shown to be
ineffective in prompting honesty [49]. Fourth, the Guatemalans who choose to declare their tax might
do so honestly. In Guatemala there are limited consequences for not paying your tax; failure to declare
is highly unlikely to result in prosecution. Thus, the taxpayers who do declare, and are thus part of our
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sample, may therefore be the subset of Guatemalans who do declare their taxes more honestly than the
rest of the population that we were not affecting with this online intervention. Fifth, the intervention
designs might simply not have had an impact on honesty in this context. Further research will be
needed to investigate to what extent and under what circumstances the interventions studied here do
or do not promote honest tax declarations.
It is important to place this result in the context of the wider and growing behavioural
science literature around tax compliance. Much of this literature is concerned with either binary
payment/declaration decisions, or the timeliness of those decisions (for example Hallsworth et al. [50]),
or with honesty measured after an audit. Our paper differs from these for two reasons. First, as stated
above, the auditing regime in Guatemala, as well as the consequences for non-compliance, are very
weak, and so follow-up to measure truth-telling is not possible. Second, the context of this study means
that it takes place ‘downstream’ of papers such as Hallsworth et al. [50], and the binary compliance
decision has already taken place. We therefore consider our interventions to be an application of the
findings of Shu et al. [25] who in their field experiment consider the decision whether or not to lie
on car insurance forms, and therefore arguably more related to the substantive literature on honesty
in behavioural science than to the tax compliance literature. As with Shu et al. [25], the (lack of a)
monitoring regime requires the assumption that people systematically lie in a direction that aligns
with their financial incentive not to pay tax, but we believe this assumption not to be onerous.
5. Conclusions
Our null results have important implications for both academic researchers and practitioners.
While previous research on tax compliance [13,18,50] has shown that messaging and framing
around tax choices can be an effective means of promoting more honesty in tax declarations,
our experiment demonstrates that previous findings cannot simply be applied in any context.
Differences between countries, institutions, and settings matter and require careful consideration
before similar interventions are scaled up in a new context. For instance, our setting differs notably
from previous studies in that the interventions to increase tax compliance were delivered online, not
in a letter as in past research. Work by Chou [49] suggests one potential reason for the failure of our
sign-before intervention: signing one’s name digitally does not have the same symbolic meaning to
signers and consequently does not invoke one’s identity in the same way. More research is required to
understand what, and how, interventions work (or occasionally fail to work) in real policy contexts.
It also highlights the importance of testing before implementing a new policy idea, providing more
evidence for the need for evidence-based policy-making [5].
Finally, publishing null results is becoming increasingly more common in psychology, economics,
policy and other disciplines. Doing so helps reduce the file-drawer problem [51] and adds to our
understanding of the tested interventions and their boundary conditions [52]. All in all, this helps
evidence-based policy-makers make more informed decisions.
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Figure A1. (T1) Honesty Declaration. Translation for text across all CAPTCHAs: ‘Please type the 
characters that you see in the picture’, and ‘You can type upper or lower case’. Treatment translation: 
‘Declaration: I will fill out this form honestly, Please sign your name to confirm this declaration’. (The 
taxpayer must then enter their name in a box below this statement before being able to press the ‘fill 
form’ button.) 
 
Figure A2. (T2) Public Good. Translation for text across all CAPTCHAs: ‘Please type the characters 
that you see in the picture’, and ‘You can type upper or lower case’. Treatment translation: ‘In 2013 
your taxes helped pay for schools, hospitals and policemen.’ 
Figure A1. (T1) Honesty Declaration. Translation for text across all CAPTCHAs: ‘Please type the
characters that you see in the picture’, and ‘You can type upper or lower case’. Treatment translation:
‘Declaration: I will fill out this form honestly, Please sign your name to confirm this declaration’.
(The taxpayer must then enter their name in a box below this statement before being able to press the
‘fill form’ button.)
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Figure A3. (T3) Enforcement. Translation for text across all CAPTCHAs: ‘Please type the characters 
that you see in the picture’, and ‘You can type upper or lower case.’ Treatment translation: ‘5060 
taxpayers in early 2014 had legal proceedings for breach of their tax obligations.’ 
 
Figure A4. (T4) Choice Public Good. Translation for text across all CAPTCHAs: ‘Please type the 
characters that you see in the picture’, and ‘You can type upper or lower case.’ Treatment translation: 
‘Please choose what you want us to direct your tax money to:’ The taxpayer is then given the choice 
of selecting ‘schools’, ‘hospitals’, or ‘policemen’. 
Figure A3. (T3) Enforcement. Translation for text across all CAPTCHAs: ‘Please type the characters that
you see in the picture’, and ‘You can type upper or lower case.’ Treatment translation: ‘5060 taxpayers
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Figure A5. (T5) Choice Enforcement. Translation for text across all CAPTCHAs: ‘Please type the 
characters that you see in the picture’, and ‘You can type upper or lower case.’ Treatment translation: 
‘Please tell us what you think should happen to people who fill out their forms dishonestly’. The 
taxpayer is then given the choice of selecting; ‘pay a fine’, ‘confiscate your assets’, or ‘go to jail’. 
 
Figure A6. (T6) Selection ‘I am and honest taxpayer’. Translation for text across all CAPTCHAs: 
‘Please type the characters that you see in the picture’, and ‘You can type upper or lower case’. 
Treatment translation: ‘Which of the following do you identify with?’ The taxpayer then has to select 
one of the following two options; ‘I am an honest taxpayer who declares truthfully’ or ‘I am a busy 
taxpayer who declares quickly’. 
Figure A5. (T5) Choice Enforcement. Translation for text across all CAPTCHAs: ‘Please type the
characters that you see in the picture’, and ‘You can type upper or lower case.’ Treatment translation:
‘Please tell us what you think should happen to people who fill out their forms dishonestly’.
The taxpayer is then given the choice of selecting; ‘pay a fine’, ‘confiscate your assets’, or ‘go to jail’.
Behav. Sci. 2017, 7, 28  15 of 21 
 
Figure A5. (T5) Choice Enforcement. Transl    ss ll PTCHAs: ‘Please type the 
characters that you see in the picture’, and ‘You ca   r or lower case.’ Treatment translation: 
‘Pl as  tell us what you t i  should hap en to people who fill out their forms dishonestly’. The 
taxpayer is then given the choice of selecting; ‘pay a fine’, ‘confiscate your assets’, or ‘go to jail’. 
 
Figure A6. (T6) Selection ‘I am and honest taxpayer’. Translation for text across all CAPTCHAs: 
‘Please type the characters that you see in the picture’, and ‘You can type upper or lower case’. 
Treatment translation: ‘Which of the following do you identify with?’ The taxpayer then has to select 
one of the following two options; ‘I am an honest taxpayer who declares truthfully’ or ‘I am a busy 
taxpayer who declares quickly’. 
Figure A6. (T6) Selection ‘I am and honest taxpayer’. Translation for text across all CAPTCHAs:
‘Please type the char cters that you see in the ict re’, ‘You can type u per or lower case’.
Treatment translation: ‘Which of the following do yo i tif it ’ The taxpayer then has to s lect
one of the foll wing two ptions; ‘I am an honest t eclares truthfully’ or ‘I am a busy
taxpayer who declares quickly’.
Behav. Sci. 2017, 7, 28 16 of 21
Appendix B. Declaraguate Website
Behav. Sci. 2017, 7, 28  16 of 21 
Appendix B. Declaraguate Website. 
 
Figure A7. Declaraguate website home page. 
 
Figure A8. Original Captcha. 
Figure 7. Declaraguate website home page.
Behav. Sci. 2017, 7, 28  16 of 21 
Appendix B. Declaraguate Website. 
 
Figure A7. Declaraguate website home page. 
 
Figure A8. Original Captcha. Figure A8. Original Captcha.
Behav. Sci. 2017, 7, 28 17 of 21
Behav. Sci. 2017, 7, 28  17 of 21 
 
Figure A9. Fill Form. 
Appendix C. Balance Checks 
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Table A1. Cont.
Variable (1) (2)
(First) (All)
Sign before 0.045 −0.033
(0.074) (0.034)
Public Good 0.004 0.004
(0.075) (0.034)
Enforcement 0.034 −0.016
(0.074) (0.034)
Constant 37.906 *** 37.338 ***
(0.051) (0.023)
Observations 715,026 3,885,225
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table A2. Balance of treatments with respect to proportion female.
Variable (1) (2)
(First) (All)
Sign before −0.005 * −0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Public Good −0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Enforcement 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Sign before −0.000 −0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Public Good −0.004 −0.002 *
(0.002) (0.001)
Enforcement −0.002 −0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.384 *** 0.375 ***
(0.002) (0.001)
Observations 627,300 3,232,686
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table A3. Balance of treatments with respect to prior tax declarations.
Variable (1) (2)
(First) (All)
Sign before −164.272 −1188.269
(2263.356) (1264.250)
Public Good −856.039 692.126
(2213.478) (1238.355)
Enforcement −605.685 −1118.926
(2230.887) (1243.896)
Sign before 2424.769 38.043
(2261.094) (1252.387)
Public Good −1654.504 147.031
(2277.990) (1257.991)
Enforcement −3296.176 −1779.398
(2266.044) (1254.607)
Constant 10,422.377 *** 12,294.340 ***
(1551.063) (871.032)
Observations 715,190 3,886,240
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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